A new framework may serve to better understand and treat pain. The model has a limited theoretical foundation, resulting in the perpetuation of dualistic and reductionist beliefs. The boundaries between the biological, psychological, and social are artificial, and the model is often applied in a fragmented manner. However, when considering pain research advancements, paired with the work of phenomenologists’ and cognitive scientists’ advanced understanding of perception, the biopsychosocial model is inadequate in many ways. From a reductionist perspective, pain is often considered to be “in the brain.” The biopsychosocial conceptualization of pain has been adopted to combat these problematic views. From a Cartesian dualist perspective, pain occurs in an immaterial mind.
The biomedical understanding of pain is problematic as it inaccurately endorses a linear relationship between noxious stimuli and pain, and is often dualist or reductionist.
We propose a new conceptualization of pain by incorporating advancements made by phenomenologists and cognitive scientists.
